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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This civil rights action raises the question of what a 
plaintiff must plead in order to state a viable claim under 
the state-created danger theory of 42 U.S.C.A. S 1983 (West 
1994 & Supp. 1997). The district court granted defendants' 
motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), finding 
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plaintiff failed to plead one of the elements of the test set 
forth by this court in Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d 
Cir. 1996) and thereby failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. Although we analyze the applicable 





Background and Procedural History 
 
On July 28, 1994, Diane Morse, a teacher at the Ardmore 
Child Care Center, was shot and killed in front of a 
classroom of children by Arcelia Truman ("Trudy") Stovall, 
a local resident with a history of mental illness. The 
Ardmore Child Care Center, which is owned and operated 
by the Daycare Association of Montgomery County, has 
operated out of a wing of Lower Merion High School for 
several years, under a lease between the Daycare 
Association and the Lower Merion School District. Stovall, 
who was subsequently convicted of the murder of Diane 
Morse and incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital, was able 
to enter the building through an unlocked rear entrance. 
 
In the weeks preceding the shooting, several contractors 
were working on construction projects at the high school, in 
the vicinity of the Ardmore Child Care Center location. 
Jamison Contractors, Inc. was engaged in construction and 
repair activities in and around the school building. 
Buttonwood Company, Inc. was painting a swimming pool 
within the building, and United States Roofing Corporation 
was repairing the roof in the area adjacent to the swimming 
pool. To accommodate their construction projects, the 
contractors made use of the back entrance to the building. 
Jamison employees would prop open the door to facilitate 
the movement of materials in and out of the building. As 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We may affirm the lower court's ruling on different grounds, provided 
the issue which forms the basis of our decision was before the lower 
court. See Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1139 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 165 (1995); Neely v. Zimmerman, 858 F.2d 
144, 149 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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part of its work on the swimming pool, Buttonwood set up 
a compressor outside of the building, which was connected 
to air-driven tools in the pool area by a series of two inch 
cables. In order to reach the tools in the pool area, 
Buttonwood ran these cables through the back entrance to 
the school. For their part, the employees of U.S. Roofing 
used the open door as a means of access to the restrooms 
located within the building. 
 
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 by 
Diane Morse's husband on his own behalf, as executor of 
her estate, and in a representative capacity on behalf of 
their daughter. The complaint alleges, inter alia, that the 
Lower Merion School District and the Daycare Association 
deprived Diane Morse of her right to be free from physical 
harm, and deprived plaintiff and his daughter of their 
fundamental right of association with the decedent. 2 In 
particular, plaintiff claims the School District had a written 
policy which provided that all side and back entrances to 
the school were to be kept locked at all times. The 
complaint alleges that, although aware of the unsecured 
back entrance, the School District and the Daycare 
Association made no effort to correct the condition, and in 
fact facilitated the workers' access by unlocking the back 
entrance each day to assist the various contractors. In 
addition, the complaint alleges the School District and the 
Daycare Association were aware of other security breaches 
prior to July 1994 that had allowed unauthorized persons 
to gain access to the building. These previous incidents had 
resulted in theft, vandalism, and, in at least one instance, 
assault. As a result, plaintiff asserts, the "environment 
created by [defendants] was dangerous, was known by 
them to be dangerous and created the opportunity for 
Trudy Stovall's attack on the decedent that would not 
otherwise have existed." 
 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The complaint also raised various state law claims against Jamison, 
Buttonwood and U.S. Roofing. The district court dismissed the state law 
claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction. In order to protect these 
claims, plaintiff subsequently filed an action in state court against the 
private defendants. 
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on two grounds. First, defendants contended that neither 
the School District nor the Daycare Association was acting 
under color of state law, as required by Section 1983.3 
Second, defendants argued that Mr. Morse's complaint 
failed to meet the requirements for a state-created danger 
claim. The district court declined to address defendants' 
color of state law arguments, ruling only on the sufficiency 
of the state-created danger claim.4 
 
The district court read plaintiff 's complaint to allege 
three distinct theories.5 The first theory of liability was that 
defendants breached their duty to maintain a safe working 
environment by leaving the back entrance unsecured. The 
second theory premised liability on defendants' alleged 
policy of refusing to institute and maintain safety 
procedures, thus demonstrating a deliberate indifference to 
Ms. Morse's constitutional rights. The final theory alleged 
that the School District and the Daycare Association were 
liable under the state-created danger theory ofS 1983. 
Although the district court analyzed each theory and found 
that plaintiff failed to state a claim under any of them, the 
only theory raised on appeal, and the only one reviewed 
here, is plaintiff's state-created danger theory. 
 
The district court began its analysis of plaintiff's claim by 
examining our recent decision in Kneipp v. Tedder, in which 
we adopted the state-created danger theory of liability 
under S 1983. 95 F.3d 1199, 1211 (1996). In particular, the 
district court looked to whether "liability based on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. With respect to this ground, defendants submitted the lease 
agreement between the Daycare Association and the School District, as 
well as the affidavit of the Daycare Association's Executive Director, in 
support of their 12(b)(6) motion. The district court noted that it could 
have, at its discretion, converted the motion into a motion for summary 
judgment. It declined to do so, however, finding these documents 
inconclusive on the color of state law issue. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. 
Dist., 1996 WL 677514, *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 1996). 
 
4. Because we, too, find that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 
the state-created danger theory, we need not address the question 
whether the School District or the Daycare Association were acting 
under color of state law at the time of Diane Morse's death. 
 
5. In his briefs on appeal, plaintiff denies this, and states that his 
complaint relied solely on the state-created danger theory of liability. 
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state-created danger theory must be predicated on 
affirmative acts by a state actor." Morse v. Lower Merion 
Sch. Dist., 1996 WL 677514, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 1996).6 
The court noted that, unlike the facts in Kneipp, which 
involved affirmative acts by the police that created an 
inherently dangerous situation for the plaintiff, the 
complaint here attempted to establish liability based 
primarily on defendants' failure to act. Because such 
failures to act "have consistently been held non-actionable 
under Section 1983,"7 the district court concluded that 
plaintiff could not support his S 1983 claim by relying on 
allegations that defendants failed to prevent the contractors 
from propping open the back door (Complaint PP 26, 28, 
30), failed to detain Ms. Stovall prior to the day of the 
murder (Complaint P 31), and refused to institute and 
maintain security (Complaint P 42). The district court held 
the only allegation in the complaint which could support 
plaintiff 's state-created danger theory was that defendants 
themselves unlocked the back entrance to the school to 
facilitate the work of the various contractors. But the 
district court declined to examine whether this constituted 
an affirmative act, and instead based its decision on a 
different element of the Kneipp analysis. 
 
The district court premised its decision on Kneipp's 
holding that a state actor can only be held liable if "a 
relationship [existed] between the state and the person 
injured . . . during which the state places the victim in 
danger of a foreseeable injury." Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1209 
(citations omitted). Because there was no dispute whether 
this relationship existed between the police and the plaintiff 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The district court acknowledged that "the line between action and 
omission is not always clear." The affirmative act requirement is 
discussed in greater detail, infra. 
 
7. Morse, 1996 WL 677514, at *6 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County 
Dept. of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area 
Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993); Searles v. Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transp. Auth., 990 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1993); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 
F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218 (1991); Huston v. 
Montgomery County, No. Civ. A. 95-4209, 1995 WL 766308 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 28, 1995)). 
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in Kneipp, the district court looked to pre-Kneipp decisions 
to analyze the parameters of this requirement. The district 
court examined Doe v. Methacton Sch. Dist., 880 F. Supp. 
380, 386 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd, 124 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 
1997), which held that the state-created danger theory 
would only affix liability if the victim of the resulting harm 
is "known and identified," and not "simply a member of the 
greater public," and Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 
1137, 1153 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 165 
(1995), where we held that "cases where the state-created 
danger theory was applied were based on discrete, grossly 
reckless acts committed by the state or state actors. . . 
leaving a discrete plaintiff vulnerable to foreseeable injury." 
Based on its reading of these two cases, as well as Martinez 
v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) and Commonwealth Bank 
& Trust Co., N.A. v. Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1987), the 
district court concluded that, "to make out a state-created 
danger claim, a plaintiff must allege facts indicating that 
there was a particular danger to the victim of the resulting 
harm." Morse, 1996 WL 677514, at *8. Because plaintiff 
failed to allege that "Diane Morse faced a particular danger 
distinct from that faced by the population of persons inside 
the school" as a result of the back entrance being left 





We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and our 
review of the grant of a motion to dismiss is plenary. Jordan 
v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 
1994). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we are 
required to accept as true all of the allegations in the 
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 
(3d Cir. 1989); D.P. Enter. Inc. v. Bucks County Community 
College, 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1984). A Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion should be granted "if it appears to a certainty that 
no relief could be granted under any set of facts which 
could be proved." D.P. Enter. Inc., 725 F.2d at 944; 
Richardson v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Health, 561 F.2d 489, 
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492 (3d Cir. 1977). But a court need not credit a 
complaint's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions" when 
deciding a motion to dismiss. In re Burlington Coat Factory 
Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 
1997)(quoting Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 
617, 628(1st Cir. 1996)).8 Mitchell v. Duvall County Sch. Bd., 
107 F.3d 837, 839-40 (11th Cir. 1997)(affirming dismissal 
of state-created danger claim where it was "beyond doubt 
that appellant cannot prove a set of facts" which support 
his claim); Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198 






Plaintiff brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983.9 By itself, Section 1983 does not create any rights, 
but provides a remedy for violations of those rights created 
by the Constitution or federal law. Baker v. McCollan, 443 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See also Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure S 1357 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that courts, when examining 
12(b)(6) motions, have rejected "legal conclusions," "unsupported 
conclusions," "unwarranted inferences," "unwarranted deductions," 
"footless conclusions of law," or "sweeping legal conclusions cast in the 
form of factual allegations"); Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 
1996)(affirming dismissal of S 1983 action and noting that "[w]hile the 
pleading standard is a liberal one, bald assertions and conclusions of 
law will not suffice."); Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 
278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[C]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions 
masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion 
to dismiss."). 
 
9. Section 1983 provides: 
 
       Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, 
       custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
       Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
       United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the 
       deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
       Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
       action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress. 
 
42 U.S.C.A. S 1983. 
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U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204. In order 
to state a claim, plaintiff must show that defendants, acting 
under color of state law, deprived him of a right secured by 
the Constitution or the laws of the United States. See 
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on 
other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
 
As noted, plaintiff alleged defendants subjected Diane 
Morse to a dangerous and ultimately fatal situation, in 
violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive 
due process, by allowing a mentally deranged and 
homicidal third party to have access to the day care center 
where Diane Morse worked. Although the general rule is 
that the state has no affirmative obligation to protect its 
citizens from the violent acts of private individuals, courts 
have recognized two exceptions to this rule. See, e.g., D.R. 
v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 
1369-73 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 
1079 (1993); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. #6D6D 6D#, 116 S. Ct. 924 (1996). The 
first of these is commonly known as the "special 
relationship" exception, and allows a plaintiff to recover 
"when the state enters into a special relationship with a 
particular citizen . . . [and] fails, under sufficiently culpable 
circumstances, to protect the health and safety of the 
citizen to whom it owes an affirmative duty." D.R., 972 F.2d 
at 1369; see also Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 
707, 713 (3d Cir. 1993). The second exception is the"state- 
created danger" theory of liability. 
 
The state-created danger theory had it origins in the 
Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). The 
petitioner in that case was a young boy who was 
chronically abused by his father. The county department of 
social services, after receiving many complaints about the 
boy's mistreatment, took several steps to ensure his safety. 
But despite these efforts, the boy remained in his father's 
custody, and was eventually beaten so savagely that he 
suffered severe brain damage. The boy and his mother sued 
the department of social services under the "special 
relationship" theory of 42 U.S.C. S 1983 for their failure to 
protect the boy from his father. Although the Court 
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ultimately rejected plaintiff's claim, 489 U.S. at 195-96, it 
went on to explain that, "[w]hile the State may have been 
aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, 
it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to 
render him any more vulnerable to them." 495 U.S. at 201. 
Based on that language, several courts of appeals have 
allowed claims under Section 1983 on the "state-created 
danger" theory. See, e.g., Dwares v. City of New York, 985 
F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 
1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 947 
(1993); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 
1990); Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 
(11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); Wood 
v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 938 (1990). 
 
We adopted the "state-created danger" theory in Kneipp v. 
Tedder. The plaintiffs there were the parents and legal 
guardians of Samantha Kneipp. Samantha and her 
husband, Joseph, were stopped by police while returning 
home on foot on a cold night in January. The police 
stopped the Kneipps a short distance from their home for 
allegedly causing a disturbance. According to the police, 
Samantha was visibly intoxicated - she had difficulty 
walking, and smelled of alcohol and urine. During the 
course of their discussion Joseph Kniepp expressed the 
need to relieve the Kneipps' babysitter, and asked the police 
if he could return home. Joseph testified that the police 
informed him he could leave, and he left assuming that 
they would either take Samantha to a hospital or the police 
station. But the police sent Samantha home alone shortly 
thereafter. Approximately two hours later, Samantha was 
found lying at the bottom of an embankment across the 
street from the Kneipps' home. As a result of her exposure 
to the cold, Samantha suffered permanent brain damage. 
Plaintiffs brought suit, alleging the police officers' actions 
deprived Samantha of her right to substantive due process 
and her liberty interest in personal security. The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants. We reversed, holding that the "state-created 
danger theory is a viable mechanism for establishing a 
constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1983," and that 
 
                                10 
  
plaintiffs had raised a triable issue of fact under that 
theory. Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1211. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we applied the four-part test 
articulated in Mark v. Hatboro, which holds a state actor 
liable if: 
 
       (1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and 
       fairly direct; (2) the state actor acted in willful 
       disregard for the safety of the plaintiff; (3) there existed 
       some relationship between the state and the plaintiff; 
       (4) the state actors used their authority to create an 
       opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for 
       the third party's crime to occur. 
 
Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Mark, 51 F.3d at 1152). 
We also noted that "[t]hose courts which have recognized 
the state-created danger theory have employed a deliberate 
indifference standard." Id. at 1208 (citations omitted). When 
this test is applied to the facts of this case, it becomes clear 
that plaintiff has not set forth a claim under S 1983 upon 
which relief can be granted. 
 
A. Foreseeable and Fairly Direct Harm 
 
The first element of the Kneipp test requires that the 
harm ultimately caused was a foreseeable and a fairly 
direct result of the state's actions. Although the plaintiff 
asserted this conclusion in his complaint, this is not 
necessarily sufficient to overcome defendants motion to 
dismiss. As we have noted, we need not accept "bald 
assertions" or "legal conclusions" contained in the 
complaint. In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities 
Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)(quoting 
Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 628 (1st 
Cir. 1996)). We hold that defendants, as a matter of law, 
could not have foreseen that allowing construction workers 
to use an unlocked back entrance for access to the school 
building would result in the murderous act of a mentally 
unstable third party, and that the tragic harm which 
ultimately befell Diane Morse was too attenuated from 
defendants' actions to support liability. 
 
First, the complaint did not allege that defendants were 
aware of Stovall's violent propensities. There are no 
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allegations that Stovall had made threats against Diane 
Morse or any other persons at the Lower Merion High 
School, or even that she had a history of violent behavior. 
The only allegation in the complaint that addresses whether 
defendants should have foreseen the danger posed by 
Stovall that day was that, during the week preceding the 
murder, she had been seen "loitering in the school and the 
school area." (Complaint P 31). Assuming that defendants 
were aware of this fact, as we must when reviewing the 
grant of a motion to dismiss, this is insufficient as a matter 
of law to put defendants on notice that Stovall would return 
in a few days with a .38 revolver and a homicidal intent. 
 
Second, there is no allegation that defendants were aware 
of anyone posing a credible threat of violence to persons 
inside the school building. Although the complaint alleges 
that defendants were aware of previous "security breaches" 
by unnamed persons, it does not allege that Stovall, or any 
other mentally deranged person, had entered the school 
building previously. In addition, the complaint contains no 
allegation, and plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts, that 
would demonstrate that defendants were aware of the 
likelihood that a mentally deranged person would enter the 
school in search of a victim. 
 
Third, Stovall's attack was not a "fairly direct" result of 
defendants' actions. We recognize that plaintiff has alleged 
that the harm which befell Ms. Morse was "a direct result 
of defendants' acts." But we are not bound to accept a 
conclusory statement, and as a matter of law this cannot 
be true. Plaintiff's allegation that, as a result of defendants' 
decision to allow construction workers to have access to the 
school through an unlocked rear entrance, Stovall was able 
to enter the building and murder Diane Morse is 
insufficient to support liability. While we must accept the 
allegation that Stovall gained access to the building 
through the unlocked rear entrance, this does not mean the 
attack on Diane Morse occurred as a direct result of 
defendants allowing the construction crews to prop open 
the door. The causation, if any, is too attenuated. Plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts which will provide the direct 
causal connection between Stovall's deadly attack and any 
of defendants' allegedly improper acts. 
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The cases which have found liability under the state- 
created danger theory do not stretch the concepts of 
foreseeability and causation this far. Kneipp itself involved 
a visibly inebriated and incapacitated woman who was left 
alone on the road by police. Consequently we concluded 
that "a reasonable jury could find that the harm likely to 
befall Samantha if separated from [her husband] while in a 
highly intoxicated state in cold weather was indeed 
foreseeable" and could have led directly to her injuries. 95 
F.3d at 1208. 
 
Similarly, the decisions to hold the state actors liable 
under the state-created danger theory in Wood v. 
Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), and Cornelius v. 
Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (11th Cir. 1989), 
were premised on facts in which the harm visited on the 
plaintiffs was more foreseeable than the random attack 
perpetrated by Stovall here. The plaintiff in Wood was the 
female passenger of a drunk driver who was pulled over late 
one evening by police. The driver was arrested and the car 
impounded, leaving Ms. Wood stranded on the road in a 
notoriously high crime area. After beginning thefive mile 
walk to her home, Ms. Wood accepted a ride from an 
unknown man who subsequently took her to a secluded 
area and raped her. Addressing the issue of foreseeable 
harm, the court noted that the "inherent danger facing a 
woman left alone at night in an unsafe area is a matter of 
common sense." 879 F.2d at 590 (citations omitted). 
 
In Cornelius, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit found that prison and town officials could 
be liable to the plaintiff, who was abducted and held 
hostage for several days by prison inmates assigned to a 
community work program in the town hall where she was 
employed. Reversing the lower court's grant of summary 
judgment, the court of appeals found that genuine issues of 
fact existed which related to the "special danger" created by 
the work squad's presence in the town hall. The court 
noted that the defendants in Cornelius knew of the 
dangerous propensities of the prison inmates assigned to 
the work program, as well as the lack of supervision over 
those inmates, and thus "were aware of the danger present 
from the community work squad inmates." 880 F.2d at 
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358. The ultimate manifestation of that danger was 
therefore foreseeable. By contrast, there is no allegation in 
the complaint here that defendants knew that Stovall posed 
a threat to anyone at Lower Merion High School, let alone 
Diane Morse. 
 
In this respect the case before us is more analogous to 
the facts in Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006 (8th 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 913 (1993). In Gregory, 
three friends were returning home from an evening of 
drinking, with one of them, Stanley Turner, serving as 
designated driver. The police stopped their vehicle for 
running a red light, and in the process of making a routine 
warrant check, discovered an outstanding warrant for 
Turner's arrest. At his request, the police allowed Turner to 
drive to the station in order to clear up the matter. After 
arriving at the station, Turner parked and went inside, 
leaving behind his two intoxicated passengers, and leaving 
the keys in the ignition. After waiting for thirty minutes, the 
passengers drove off, and were involved in a single car 
accident which killed the driver and injured the other 
passenger. Plaintiffs - the surviving passenger and the wife, 
son and estate of the decedent - brought a claim against 
the police under the state-created danger theory. The 
district court granted the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed. The court 
concluded that even if the police were aware that both 
passengers were intoxicated, a reasonable trier of fact could 
not find that the police placed them in a dangerous 
situation by merely leaving them alone in the car. Id. at 
1011 (contrasting the facts there with the facts in Wood). 
"Simply put, it was not unsafe for the intoxicated 
[passengers] to wait for Turner inside the car where it was 
parked until Turner inexplicably left the keys with them." 
Id. at 1012. The court ruled that because Turner's 
unforeseeable act was the catalyst for the injury which 
plaintiffs suffered, the police could not be held liable. Id. 
 
The same can be said in the case before us. Here, it was 
not defendants' decision to allow the rear entrance to the 
school to remain open that precipitated or was the catalyst 
for the attack on Ms. Morse. Furthermore, we believe that 
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the harm allegedly created by the defendants in Gregory 
was more foreseeable than the harm allegedly created here. 
Unlike the situation in Gregory, where the defendants were 
aware that intoxicated passengers were left behind in the 
car, the defendants here were unaware that any mentally 
deranged person, let alone Stovall, was waiting outside the 
building for an opportunity to cause harm. Based on a 
review of the complaint, we find that plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts which will entitle him to relief. Defendants could 
not have foreseen the danger to Diane Morse, nor, as a 
matter of law, can their actions be said to have directly 
caused the attack. Consequently, plaintiff has failed to 
plead adequately the foreseeable injury element of the 
Kneipp test. 
 
B. Willful Disregard for Plaintiff's Safety 
 
The second prong of the Kneipp test asks whether the 
state actor acted with willful disregard for or deliberate 
indifference to plaintiff's safety. Kneipp , 95 F.3d at 1208 & 
n.21. "[T]he environment created by the state actors must 
be dangerous; they must know it to be dangerous; and . . . 
[they] must have been at least deliberately indifferent." 
Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th 
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1017 (1995). See also 
Leffal v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 
1994) ("[I]t is not enough to show that the state increased 
the danger of harm from third persons; the [S] 1983 
plaintiff must also show that the state acted with the 
requisite degree of culpability in failing to protect the 
plaintiff."). In other words, the state's actions must evince 
a willingness to ignore a foreseeable danger or risk. Of 
course, the notion of deliberate indifference contemplates a 
danger that must at least be foreseeable. In Kneipp, we 
focused on the police officers' decision to send Samantha 
Kneipp home alone, despite their awareness of her 
intoxicated and incapacitated state, as evidence of their 
deliberate indifference. In Cornelius, the court held the 
defendants could be liable based on their knowledge of the 
risk created by the presence of the community work squad 
inmates. 880 F.2d at 358. These factors are not present 
here. Defendants could not have been aware of the danger 
posed by Stovall, nor could they have foreseen it. As a 
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matter of law they cannot have acted with willful disregard 
for Diane Morse's safety.10 
 
Our decision in Mark v. Borough of Hatboro is instructive. 
The plaintiff owned an auto repair business that was 
destroyed in a fire set by a volunteer firefighter. The 
plaintiff filed a S 1983 action against the borough and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The Kneipp court noted that "we have declined to distinguish such 
terms as "deliberate indifference," "reckless indifference," "gross 
negligence," or "reckless disregard" in the context of a violation of 
substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment." 95 F.3d at 
1208 n.21 (citing Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 
464 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1989)). The concept of "willful disregard" fits within 
this same ill-defined category of mens rea. "Willful disregard" and 
"reckless indifference" appear to fall somewhere between intent, which 
"includes proceeding with knowledge that the harm is substantially 
certain to occur" and negligence, which involves"the mere unreasonable 
risk of harm to another." W. Page Keeton et al, Prosser & Keeton on 
Torts S 34 at 212 (5th ed. 1984). Thus the term "willful" indifference is 
somewhat misleading, requiring not an intent to harm, but a failure to 
act appropriately in light of a known or obvious risk. Id. at 213-14 ("The 
`willful' requirement, therefore, breaks down and receives at best lip 
service, where it is clear from the facts that the defendant, whatever his 
state of mind, has proceeded in disregard of a high and excessive degree 
of danger, either known to him or apparent to a reasonable person in his 
position."). 
 
The Restatement (Second) on Torts S 500 reiterates this standard: 
 
       The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of 
another 
       if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is 
his 
       duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts 
       which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his 
       conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, 
       but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is 
       necessary to make his conduct negligent. 
 
The Restatement underscores that the test of willful indifference does not 
require that the state actor "recognize [his conduct] as being extremely 
dangerous . . . [but that] he knows or has reason to know of 
circumstances which would bring home to the realization of the 
ordinary, reasonable man the highly dangerous character of his 
conduct." Id., comment c. The element of willfulness, however, is not 
entirely disregarded, and thus "[c]onduct cannot be in reckless disregard 
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fire company, claiming their failure to properly screen 
volunteer firefighters resulted in the damage to his 
property. Affirming the district court's grant of summary 
judgment, we rejected plaintiff's claim that "the danger of 
volunteer firefighters committing arson is so grave and so 
obvious that the defendants failure [to screen volunteers] 
evinced willful disregard for the rights of individuals with 
whom the firefighters came in contact." Mark, 51 F.3d at 
1140. A similar analysis can be applied to the allegations 
here. As contrasted with the risk that an intoxicated 
woman left alone on the road during inclement weather 
might be injured, the risk that unlocking a school entrance 
would invite the actions of a deranged third person is no 
more a foreseeable risk than the risk that a firefighter will 
have a proclivity for arson. Consequently, defendants here 
cannot have acted with the requisite culpability to be liable 
under the state-created danger theory. 
 
Also instructive is the decision of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Dallas Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 
U.S. 1017 (1995). In that case, a student at a Dallas high 
school was killed by a stray bullet fired by a non-student 
during an argument in a school hallway. The ruckus was 
instigated by the non-student, who was able to enter the 
school carrying a concealed weapon because the school's 
metal detectors were not in use. The decedent's father filed 
suit under S 1983, claiming, inter alia, that the school 
district was responsible for his son's death under the state- 
created danger theory. The district court granted 
defendants' motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals 
affirmed. According to the court, 
 
       [a]ctual knowledge of a serious risk of physical danger 
       to the plaintiff has been a common feature of the state- 
       created danger cases. From the pleadings in this case, 
       no legitimate inference can be drawn that the school 
       officials might have been actually aware of a high risk 
       that an armed non student invader would enter the 
       campus and fire a pistol randomly during school 
       hours. 
 
38 F.3d at 201-202. The court of appeals found that "the 
most that may be said of defendants' ultimately ineffective 
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attempts to secure the environment is that they were 
negligent, but not that they were deliberately indifferent." 
Id. at 202. 
 
The same is true in the case before us. Stovall's attack on 
Diane Morse was not a foreseeable risk, and there is no 
allegation in the complaint that defendants knew of the 
threat she posed. Defendants, by allowing construction 
workers to keep the rear entrance to the school unlocked, 
did not willfully or deliberately disregard a foreseeable 
danger. Assuming their actions rose to the level of 
negligence, merely negligent acts cannot support a claim 
under the state-created danger theory of S 1983. Kneipp, 95 
F.3d at 1208; Johnson, 38 F.3d at 202. Much like the 
decedent in Johnson, Morse was "the tragic victim of 
random criminal conduct rather than of school officials' 
deliberate, callous decisions," and plaintiff's complaint 
cannot be read to allege otherwise. Consequently, plaintiff 
has not met his pleading burden under the second prong of 
the Kneipp test. 
 
C. Relationship Between State and Plaintiff - Foreseeable 
       Plaintiff. 
 
The third element of the Kneipp test asks whether "there 
existed some relationship between the state and the 
plaintiff." In Mark, when we initially identified this as an 
element of the state-created danger theory, we explained 
that the cases which had found liability were based on facts 
where the state acted in such a way as to leave "a discrete 
plaintiff vulnerable to a foreseeable injury." 51 F.3d at 
1153. In Kneipp we found there was "a relationship 
between the state and [Ms. Kneipp] . . . during which the 
state place[d] the victim in danger of a foreseeable injury." 
We then distinguished this "relationship" element of the 
state-created danger theory from that required under the 
"special relationship" theory of DeShaney, noting that "the 
relationship requirement under the state-created danger 
theory contemplates some contact such that the plaintiff 
was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts in a tort 
sense." 95 F.3d at 1209 n.22. 
 
The district court here interpreted the "foreseeable 
plaintiff" element11 ofKneipp and Mark to require that "a 
plaintiff must allege facts indicating that there was a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Although the district court referred to this element as the "discrete 
plaintiff " requirement, we use the term "foreseeable plaintiff" to 
describe 
this element of the Mark test. 
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particular danger to the victim of the resulting harm." 
Morse, 1996 WL 677514, at *2. The district court traced the 
progression of the "foreseeable plaintiff" requirement from 
its origins in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980). 
Martinez involved a S 1983 action brought by the parents of 
a young girl who was murdered by a parolee five months 
after his release from prison. Plaintiffs alleged that the 
officials responsible for granting parole were liable for their 
daughter's death. In rejecting plaintiffs' claims, the 
Supreme Court stated that "the parole board was not aware 
that appellant's decedent, as distinguished from the public 
at large, faced any special danger." 444 U.S. at 285. The 
district court read this language to require that the state 
actor be aware that it is creating a risk of harm to a 
particular plaintiff. 
 
Our decision in Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Russell, 825 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1987) also addressed the 
issue of who qualifies as a "foreseeable plaintiff." In that 
instance a suit was filed on behalf of a couple murdered by 
an escaped inmate, alleging that breaches in the prison's 
security resulted in the prisoner's escape and, ultimately, 
the couple's death. We held that prison officials were not 
liable on the grounds that, inter alia, they could not have 
known that decedents faced any particular threat greater 
than that faced by the "public at large." Id. at 16. Once 
again, the district court here read this case as requiring 
plaintiffs employing the state-created danger theory to 
allege they faced a particular threat of harm which set them 
apart from the general public. 
 
The district court next examined our decision in Mark v. 
Borough of Hatboro. As we have noted, the actor in that 
case was a volunteer firefighter who set fire to and 
destroyed the plaintiff's auto repair business. The plaintiff 
contended the municipality was liable to him for arson 
damage under the state-created danger theory. We declined 
to address the viability of the theory at that time, ruling 
that in any event a constitutional violation could not be 
made out under the facts of the case. As we stated: 
 
       When the alleged unlawful act is a policy directed at 
       the public at large - namely a failure to protect the 
       public by failing adequately to screen applicants for 
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       membership in a volunteer fire company, the rationale 
       behind the rule disappears - there can be no specific 
       knowledge of the particular plaintiff's condition, and 
       there is no relationship between the defendant and the 
       plaintiff. 
 
51 F.3d at 1153. Focusing on this language, the district 
court interpreted the third prong of the Kneipp test to 
require an allegation that the state actor was aware of a 
danger to a specific individual. Because the complaint did 
not allege this, the district court held that plaintiff failed to 
state a claim under the state-created danger theory.12 
 
We analyze the foreseeable plaintiff prong somewhat 
differently than the district court. It seems evident that the 
Supreme Court's "public at large" language in Martinez, as 
well as our statements in Commonwealth and Marks, 
exclude from the reach of the state-created danger theory 
those instances where the state actor creates only a threat 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. There appears to be some question whether Mark and Kneipp require 
the state actor have "specific knowledge" of the plaintiff, or merely that 
the plaintiff was a "foreseeable" victim. But any tension, we believe, can 
be explained by a review of the facts of each case. Discussing whether 
the creation of a danger to the "public at large" could lead to liability 
under the state-created danger theory, the Mark court noted that "when 
the alleged unlawful act is a policy directed at the public at large . . . 
there can be no specific knowledge of the particular plaintiff's 
condition" 
and thus the third element of the Mark test is not met. 51 F.3d at 1153. 
The Kneipp court, on the other hand, stated that the relationship 
element of the state-created danger theory "contemplates some contact 
such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of a defendant's acts in 
a tort sense." 95 F.3d at 1209 n.22. The distinguishing characteristic 
here is the allegedly unlawful act. Mark involved a claim in which the 
alleged "act" was a policy directed at the public at large, whereas the 
acts of the police officer in Kneipp were directed at a particular 
individual. Where the state actor has allegedly created a danger towards 
the public generally, rather than an individual or group of individuals, 
holding a state actor liable for the injuries of foreseeable plaintiffs 
would 
expand the scope of the state-created danger theory beyond its useful 
and intended limits. Where, as here, the allegedly unlawful acts of the 
state actor affect only a limited group of potential plaintiffs, the 
potentially broad reach of the state-created danger theory is constrained 
by examining whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs were "foreseeable" 
victims. 
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to the general population. This is in keeping with the 
Court's decision in DeShaney, and the general rule that the 
state is not obligated to protect its citizens from the 
random, violent acts of private persons. But it does not 
appear this limitation necessarily restricts the scope of 
S 1983 to those instances where a specific individual is 
placed in danger. Another view of these cases would allow 
a plaintiff, in certain situations, to bring a state-created 
danger claim if the plaintiff was a member of a discrete 
class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought 
about by the state's actions. Stated differently, depending 
on the facts of a particular case, a "discrete plaintiff" may 
mean a specific person or a specific class of persons. The 
primary focus when making this determination is 
foreseeability. 
 
Some of the cases that have applied the state-created 
danger theory have held state actors liable for creating a 
risk to a definable class of persons. The decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1993), is 
illustrative. In that case, police officers arrested the driver 
of a vehicle, Cathy Irby, and left behind her intoxicated 
passenger, Larry Rice, with the keys to the car. A few hours 
later Rice, while driving Irby's car, collided head on with 
plaintiff 's vehicle, killing plaintiff 's wife and pre-natal son, 
and injuring the plaintiff, his two daughters and his in- 
laws. The court of appeals reversed the lower court's 
dismissal of plaintiff 's state-created danger claim, noting 
that "it was the police action in removing Irby, combined 
with their knowledge of Rice's intoxication, which creates 
their liability for the subsequent accident."13 Clearly the act 
of placing a drunk driver at the wheel of the car did not 
create a danger to the Reed family specifically. The court of 
appeals found that the act "rendered the Reeds and the 
other motorists on Route 130 vulnerable to a dangerous 
driver." Id. at 1127 ("When the police create a specific 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The Reed court assumed, based on its reading of the complaint, that 
Irby was sober at the time of the arrest. It noted, however, that if she 
had in fact been intoxicated, the state could not be liable "for 
exchanging 
one drunk driver for another" because even "without state intervention, 
the same danger would exist." 986 F.2d at 1125. 
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danger, they need not know who in particular will be hurt. 
Some dangers are so evident, while their victims are so 
random, that state actors can be held accountable by any 
injured party."). 
 
It is evident that the case law in this area is not uniform 
on the necessity to allege a specific plaintiff as opposed to 
a specific class of plaintiffs. What is clear is that a member 
of the general public may not qualify. Of course, DeShaney 
involved a discrete, individual plaintiff, and as the source of 
the state-created danger theory, can be read to restrict who 
may sue under this theory. But in other situations, 
requiring the plaintiff to be part of an identifiable and 
discrete class of persons subject to the harm the state 
allegedly has created also fits within the purposes of the 
state-created danger theory. 
 
For this reason, it would not appear that the state- 
created danger theory of liability under S 1983 always 
requires knowledge that a specific individual has been 
placed in harm's way. Although it is appropriate to draw 
lines here, there would appear to be no principled 
distinction between a discrete plaintiff and a discrete class 
of plaintiffs. The ultimate test is one of foreseeability. 
 
The issue here is whether Diane Morse, and all those 
present in Lower Merion High School, were a sufficiently 
discrete group of persons who could have been foreseeable 
victims of an armed and dangerous intruder. This is by no 
means an easy question, for the reasons we have 
expressed. But we need not decide this issue here because 
we hold that plaintiff cannot satisfy the other three prongs 
of the Kniepp test. 
 
D. Creating the Opportunity for Harm 
 
The final element of the Kneipp test is whether the state 
actor used its authority to create an opportunity which 
otherwise would not have existed for the specific harm to 
occur. The district court read this requirement to 
contemplate that a state actor must affirmatively act to 
create the risk which results in harm to the plaintiff. Under 
the allegations presented here, the district court concluded 
that the only affirmative act attributable to the defendants 
was the assertion they unlocked the door to facilitate the 
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work of the various contractors at the high school. The 
district court declined to address whether the act of 
unlocking the door rose "to the level required to impose 
liability under the state-created danger theory," Morse, 
1996 WL 677514, at *6 (quoting Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1207), 
relying instead on plaintiff's failure to satisfy the 
"foreseeable plaintiff " requirement under Kneipp. 
 
The case law addressing the question whether an 
affirmative act is required under the state-created danger 
theory, and if so what constitutes an affirmative act for 
purposes of liability, is less than clear. Conduct that has 
been held to be an affirmative act under one set of facts has 
not met that standard in a similar setting. For example, we 
held in Kneipp that the police officer's act of "interven[ing] 
to cut off Samantha's private source of protection by giving 
Joseph permission to go home alone" constituted an 
affirmative act for purposes of S 1983 liability.14 95 F.3d at 
1210; see also Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990) (trooper liable for 
arresting driver of vehicle and leaving female passenger 
alone in a high crime area); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 
381 (7th Cir. 1979) (arresting driver and leaving minor 
passengers behind in vehicle on side of highway gave rise 
to constitutional claim). 
 
By comparison, the opinion in Gregory v. City of Rogers, 
974 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1992), draws a different conclusion 
from a similar act. In that instance, the police removed the 
designated driver of a vehicle because of an outstanding 
arrest warrant, and left behind two intoxicated persons who 
subsequently drove off and were involved in an accident. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
held the police officer could not be held to have 
affirmatively placed the intoxicated passengers in danger. 
 
Courts that have addressed this issue have pointed out 
that the line between an affirmative act and an omission is 
difficult to draw. As the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit said: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Whether the officers's actions in Kneipp constituted an affirmative 
act 
or an act of omission is a close question. 
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       We do not want to pretend that the line between action 
       and inaction, between inflicting and failing to prevent 
       the infliction of harm, is clearer than it is. If the state 
       puts a man in a position of danger from private 
       persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be 
       heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as 
       much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into 
       a snake pit. 
 
Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) The 
district court here noted this difficulty when it said that 
"[s]tate-created danger law does not address the question of 
when an act crosses the line and becomes an affirmative 
act warranting Section 1983 liability." Morse at *6 n.11. 
 
Whether an affirmative act rather than an act of omission 
is required under the state-created danger theory appears 
to have been answered by Mark. As the Mark court noted, 
one of the common factors in cases addressing the state- 
created danger is that the state actors "used their authority 
to create an opportunity that otherwise would not have 
existed for the third party's crime to occur." Mark, 51 F.3d 
at 1152. Thus, the dispositive factor appears to be whether 
the state has in some way placed the plaintiff in a 
dangerous position that was foreseeable, and not whether 
the act was more appropriately characterized as an 
affirmative act or an omission. 
 
The following cases are illustrative of this principle. In 
Mitchell v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 107 F.3d 837 (11th Cir. 
1997), the court of appeals rejected a state-created danger 
claim under facts analogous to the case before us. The 
decedent, Richard Mitchell, was a fourteen year-old student 
who was shot and killed one evening while waiting for a 
ride home from a school function. Mitchell had attempted 
to telephone his father from inside the school 
administration office, but was denied entry. Instead he 
used an outside pay phone, and, while waiting for his 
father on a driveway adjacent to the school, was shot and 
killed during a robbery attempt. The court of appeals 
rejected plaintiff's state-created danger theory on the 
grounds that he failed to "show that the state affirmatively 
placed decedent in a position of danger." Id. at 839. 
According to the court, nothing the school did "required 
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[decedent] to wait where he did." Indeed, the boy could have 
waited inside the administration building or immediately 
outside, rather than waiting "a considerable distance away 
on the edge of the school's parking lot." Because the 
plaintiffs could prove no set of facts which would 
demonstrate that either an act or omission on the part of 
the state actors placed the decedent closer to the ultimate 
harm, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the 
complaint. 
 
In a case before this Court, two high school students filed 
a S 1983 claim alleging they were sexually molested by 
fellow students in the bathroom and darkroom of their 
graphic arts class room. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area 
Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993). According to 
their complaint, the high school's failure to adequately 
supervise the class or investigate the misconduct created 
the dangerous situation that resulted in their injuries. We 
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the 
school was not liable because the plaintiffs did not 
demonstrate that the state placed the plaintiffs in danger, 
increased their risk of harm, or made them more vulnerable 
to danger. "Plaintiffs did not suffer harm, however, from 
that kind of foreseeable risk. . . . Plaintiff's harm came 
about solely through the acts of private persons without the 
level of intermingling of state conduct with private violence 
that supported liability in Wood, Swader, and Cornelius." 
972 F.2d at 1375. 
 
In both cases, there was no direct causal connection 
between the acts or omissions of the state and the harm 
which befell the victim. In neither case was it the act or 
omission of the state actor that directly placed the victim in 
harm's way. The same can be said of the case before us. 
Plaintiff does not allege, nor can he prove, that defendants 
placed Diane Morse in "a dangerous environment stripped 
of means to defend [herself] and cut off from sources of 
aid." Johnson, 38 F.3d at 202. Nor does plaintiff allege that 
defendants placed her in a "unique confrontational 
encounter" with Stovall. Cornelius, 880 F.2d at 359. What 
plaintiff does allege is that defendants, by unlocking the 
rear entrance of the school building, "increased the risk to 
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Diane Morse . . . and left Diane Morse vulnerable to the 
actions of her attacker." Complaint P 44. As we have 
already noted, however, Stovall's deadly attack was not a 
foreseeable and fairly direct result of defendants' behavior. 
Plaintiff, therefore, can prove no set of facts that will 
demonstrate that defendants placed Diane Morse in harm's 
way, and consequently has not satisfied the fourth prong of 




Based on the foregoing, we hold that plaintiff has not met 
the test set forth in Kneipp v. Tedder and has failed to state 
a claim under the state-created danger theory of 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983. 
 
We will affirm the judgment of the district court. 
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